Stéphane Jonard
Cultural Interpreter at the Musée de la Grande Guerre, France
E-mail Interview
E-mail Interview
What was French civilian reaction immediately following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand?
The French population show[ed] little concern regarding the event. For a part of the population [it was] holliday time, notably for the rich. Balkanic countries and affairs seem[ed] far far away. Thus, even in Paris, the [news] of Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination [was] rapidly [forgotten]. Therefore, the Ultimatum emitted by Austria to Serbia on July 23rd [was] seen as a terrible surprise. On July 16th, President Raymond Poincaré, who had left France together with René Viviani, Council President, for a political strenghening trip purpose through Russia, Sweden, Norvegia and Danemark, said that the voyage was “delightful”.
When the crisis [struck] on July 23rd, people started to get a bit concerned and but only hoped things would not worsen.
Austriano-Serbian relationships were not the main [elements] that tore apart France at that time, but the prosecution of Madame Caillaux . . . . [she had shot] Gaston Calmette – head of the Figaro journal, who decided to publish private [letters] . . . .
This political and personnal [sic] affair [was] followed by the French population with much interest and care. This [led] to political consequences of much importance, for it [prevented] Mr. Caillaux [from becoming] Council president . . . who would have tried to soften the relationships with Germany and . . . promote Jean Jaurès – a convicted pacifist – to the head of the Foreign Office to soften the tense European climate.
What was the French government’s attitude towards the assassination and its immediate effects?
France [did] not show much concern and adopt[ed] quite a passive state regarding the July 1914 crisis. France did not either calm down political outruns throughout Europe nor did she [light] the fire that [would] later spread and lead to a worldwide conflict. Never did France [ask] Russia not to mobilize her army, which would undoubtedly lead to war. Indeed, President Poincaré and council president Viviani had just returned from their voyage to Russia where they reaffirmed the military alliance and strength between the two countries; therefore it was to be watched as a political weakness and nonsense to ask Russia, some days after, to moderate her actions.
Of course France tried to give the image of a responsible nation which had no mean to harm her neighbor countries, notably by drawing back her troops from 10km in the inner country all along the boundary with Germany. But this had one goal, showing Great-Britain, which was in favor of peace, that France was on the defensive and pacifist; this way Britain would by no doubt join forces with France in case Germany would show agressiveness. . . .
Was Plan XVII a defensive plan or was France hoping for war with Germany?
. . . the only goal of Plan XVII – created by Foch, was to breach the German lines in Alsace-Lorraine so that France could recover (in the early beginning of conflict) the regions she had lost some decades ago. Thus, this plan did not take any care of whatever could be the German plans. Of course French officers knew very well that Germany could go through Belgium, but France wanted war so much to recover her territories that it was considered to be “a good for nothing” to think about a defensive plan once again. General Joseph Joffre, Head of the French armies, said about Plan XVII that the main goal was to take back Alsace-Lorraine, as for the rest of whatever could happen, one would have to improvise. . . .
What was the state of the French government and general public before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand?
The French situation in the late time before war is that of a steady republic. Political life, media development, [transportation] development [and] alphabetization of the entire society is what obsess[ed] people most. In this context, many people from very different social classes, even people that had never had the possibility to be considered a voice to listen, started to take part in political debates and decisions, leading sometimes to social unrest and strikes like in 1910 with the SNCF great strike – which was violently repressed.
Despite the steadiness of the republican regime, since the beginning of the century political instabilities spread throughout France; lots of alliances [were] concluded and broken, many people took responsibilities in the government’s decisions to be replaced few months or years later.
In 1912, things started to move a bit in favor of a conflict. The revival of “nationalism” – not as violent as that of Dreyfus Affair period – Agadir and Balkan crisis, the increasing number of military newspapers, the . . . [renewal of] interest in Alsace-Lorraine and the creation of a Joan of Arc day, [caused tense relationships] between France and Germany. . . .
The main political figure of that period [was] Raymond Poincaré, who became president in 1913 and who worked a lot to give . . . the president . . . [back its status in] importance in the government’s decisions, importance that had been swooped by the role of the Council President. Indeed, a president during the 3rd Republic was somehow no more than the showcase of the country. It is Poincaré who [choose] René Viviani to take the seat of Council President, he who founded the newspaper L’Humanité. He who ask[ed] for the Sacred Union between every social classes and political parties in a time of war on August 4th.
Meanwhile, public institutions tried to enhance that patriotic sense of the country, thus transforming slowly the educational system from a religious one based on the worshipping of [G]od to a republican and laic one based on the worshipping of Patry [sic]. Those institutions promoted a society based on family, which lead to the creation of family-neighborhoods, family-towns, family-nation, to reinforce the national convictions. . . .
Strangely though, regarding the context and society we just described, the declaration of war was not welcomed with a general enthousiasm [sic] as the mobilisation of the people by August 1914 was somewhat resigned.
The French population show[ed] little concern regarding the event. For a part of the population [it was] holliday time, notably for the rich. Balkanic countries and affairs seem[ed] far far away. Thus, even in Paris, the [news] of Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination [was] rapidly [forgotten]. Therefore, the Ultimatum emitted by Austria to Serbia on July 23rd [was] seen as a terrible surprise. On July 16th, President Raymond Poincaré, who had left France together with René Viviani, Council President, for a political strenghening trip purpose through Russia, Sweden, Norvegia and Danemark, said that the voyage was “delightful”.
When the crisis [struck] on July 23rd, people started to get a bit concerned and but only hoped things would not worsen.
Austriano-Serbian relationships were not the main [elements] that tore apart France at that time, but the prosecution of Madame Caillaux . . . . [she had shot] Gaston Calmette – head of the Figaro journal, who decided to publish private [letters] . . . .
This political and personnal [sic] affair [was] followed by the French population with much interest and care. This [led] to political consequences of much importance, for it [prevented] Mr. Caillaux [from becoming] Council president . . . who would have tried to soften the relationships with Germany and . . . promote Jean Jaurès – a convicted pacifist – to the head of the Foreign Office to soften the tense European climate.
What was the French government’s attitude towards the assassination and its immediate effects?
France [did] not show much concern and adopt[ed] quite a passive state regarding the July 1914 crisis. France did not either calm down political outruns throughout Europe nor did she [light] the fire that [would] later spread and lead to a worldwide conflict. Never did France [ask] Russia not to mobilize her army, which would undoubtedly lead to war. Indeed, President Poincaré and council president Viviani had just returned from their voyage to Russia where they reaffirmed the military alliance and strength between the two countries; therefore it was to be watched as a political weakness and nonsense to ask Russia, some days after, to moderate her actions.
Of course France tried to give the image of a responsible nation which had no mean to harm her neighbor countries, notably by drawing back her troops from 10km in the inner country all along the boundary with Germany. But this had one goal, showing Great-Britain, which was in favor of peace, that France was on the defensive and pacifist; this way Britain would by no doubt join forces with France in case Germany would show agressiveness. . . .
Was Plan XVII a defensive plan or was France hoping for war with Germany?
. . . the only goal of Plan XVII – created by Foch, was to breach the German lines in Alsace-Lorraine so that France could recover (in the early beginning of conflict) the regions she had lost some decades ago. Thus, this plan did not take any care of whatever could be the German plans. Of course French officers knew very well that Germany could go through Belgium, but France wanted war so much to recover her territories that it was considered to be “a good for nothing” to think about a defensive plan once again. General Joseph Joffre, Head of the French armies, said about Plan XVII that the main goal was to take back Alsace-Lorraine, as for the rest of whatever could happen, one would have to improvise. . . .
What was the state of the French government and general public before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand?
The French situation in the late time before war is that of a steady republic. Political life, media development, [transportation] development [and] alphabetization of the entire society is what obsess[ed] people most. In this context, many people from very different social classes, even people that had never had the possibility to be considered a voice to listen, started to take part in political debates and decisions, leading sometimes to social unrest and strikes like in 1910 with the SNCF great strike – which was violently repressed.
Despite the steadiness of the republican regime, since the beginning of the century political instabilities spread throughout France; lots of alliances [were] concluded and broken, many people took responsibilities in the government’s decisions to be replaced few months or years later.
In 1912, things started to move a bit in favor of a conflict. The revival of “nationalism” – not as violent as that of Dreyfus Affair period – Agadir and Balkan crisis, the increasing number of military newspapers, the . . . [renewal of] interest in Alsace-Lorraine and the creation of a Joan of Arc day, [caused tense relationships] between France and Germany. . . .
The main political figure of that period [was] Raymond Poincaré, who became president in 1913 and who worked a lot to give . . . the president . . . [back its status in] importance in the government’s decisions, importance that had been swooped by the role of the Council President. Indeed, a president during the 3rd Republic was somehow no more than the showcase of the country. It is Poincaré who [choose] René Viviani to take the seat of Council President, he who founded the newspaper L’Humanité. He who ask[ed] for the Sacred Union between every social classes and political parties in a time of war on August 4th.
Meanwhile, public institutions tried to enhance that patriotic sense of the country, thus transforming slowly the educational system from a religious one based on the worshipping of [G]od to a republican and laic one based on the worshipping of Patry [sic]. Those institutions promoted a society based on family, which lead to the creation of family-neighborhoods, family-towns, family-nation, to reinforce the national convictions. . . .
Strangely though, regarding the context and society we just described, the declaration of war was not welcomed with a general enthousiasm [sic] as the mobilisation of the people by August 1914 was somewhat resigned.