Austria and Germany
"[Germany] soon found themselves involved . . . in actions which they did not approve, and by decisions which were taken against their advice; but they could not seriously object - at least until the eleventh hour when it proved too late - because they had pledged their support to Austria in advance, and any hesitation on their part would only weaken the Triple Alliance at the critical moment when it most needed to be strong."
~Sidney Fay, 2: 223
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Emperor Franz Josef of Austria
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The 'Blank Cheque': Austria-Hungary and GermanyBefore taking action against the Serbian crisis, Austria-Hungary "needed Germany to protect its back against Russia" (Strachan 12). However, Germany only stated that Austria "must 'march into Serbia' with Germany's backing even if a war with Russia resulted." This "secret assurance", followed with encouragement from the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg and foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow to "send the ultimatum [to Serbia] and declare war without delay", referred to as the 'blank cheque', gave Austria the confidence to set off the chain of events that began world war (Stevenson 13).
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By urging Austria to take action, "Germany willed a local war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia" and "deliberately risked a continental war against France and Russia" (Stevenson 14). "They saw a strong likelihood that Russia would stand aside, and that Britain and France would urge it to do so. But they accepted squarely the prospect of a European conflagration if it did not. . . ." (Stevenson 21) As to Russia's allies, Bethmann-Hollweg considered the Triple Entente "a brittle and friable compact", and one which could be easily diffused if Britain and France refused to come to Russia's aid in the advent of a Balkan War. Promising only that "if Russia intervened it [Austria-Hungary] would have Germany's backing" (Strachan 13), Prussia's noncommittal stance was nevertheless interpreted as "pressure . . . for action", and Austria-Hungary seized the chance to "act while it could" (Strachan 14 - 15).
Austria-Hungary's Ultimatum to Serbia
"Austria-Hungary's joint council of ministers decided on 7 July that the ultimatum should be so stringent as to 'make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by
means of military action should be opened.'"
~David Stevenson 10-11
means of military action should be opened.'"
~David Stevenson 10-11
The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia
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With "much of the army['s] . . . peasant soldiers released to help bring in the harvest" (Strachan 15), Austria could not send the ultimatum until July 23, in which it requested Serbia to "desist from the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation. . . . suppress with all the means at its command . . . criminal and terroristic propaganda" and "accept Austro-Hungarian representation on its own internal inquiry into the assassinations" (The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia). In a brilliant diplomatic move, Serbia "disarmed criticism by professing its readiness to go as far in its compliance with Austria-Hungary's demands as was compatible with its status as an independent country" (Strachan 16), and "accepted nearly every demand but consented to Austrian involvement in a judicial inquiry only if that inquiry was subject to Serbia's constitution and to international law" (Stevenson 9). Austria-Hungary rejected Serbia's reply and declared war on July 28. |