Manfred J. Enssle
Interview Transcript
Professor Emeritus, Department of History, Colorado State University
Personal Interview
Professor Emeritus, Department of History, Colorado State University
Personal Interview
What was the civilian reaction immediately following the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand?
[This] is not a question that yields much information. In the countries in Europe there was then no fully functioning democracy in our sense of it. Our sense of it is that a democracy means huge amounts of public information all the time, huge press establishment, etc. . . Even if there had been a lively public response, the time span between Sarajevo (Francis Ferdinand and Sophie’s assassination) on June 28, 1914, and the outbreak of the war on August 4 is something like five weeks.
The reactions were probably diverse . . . there were some who were for the war, and some of who were against the coming of war, but [these reactions] would not reveal a great deal given that only some seven countries at that time had enfranchised most of their males. Only seven of the thirty some countries . . . being involved in this had given the franchise (the vote) to their males.
As some experts point out . . . political elites were not seriously challenged by public opinion as yet. In other words . . . the elites that ran the countries often also were part of the elites that ran the newspapers. Which is to say, they manipulated public opinion. If there’s anything coming out at that time, it’ll be pretty much manipulated stuff. . . . Political elites were not as threatened by public opinion as they are today. The fact that they controlled the press is a big factor. It was more of a hierarchical society and less of a democratic one, so that public opinion did not play the kind of role that it did later on. It was more of a hierarchical society. . . it wasn’t fully democratic yet in any sense. The press was new at the time too.
Was Russian mobilization the key factor in the escalation of a localized conflict into a European war?
Russian mobilization was not the key factor. . . . It was one key factor. . . . Russia’s primitive railway network meant that their mobilization was to be so slow as to necessitate. . . . that they mobilize before the war. . . . The Austrian declaration on the 28 July may have been a more important factor. . . . Germany . . . did not seek to actively halt the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.
Do you believe that political leaders could have avoided war?
If there had been a genuine European interdependence, the leaders could have avoided war. Yes, they could have avoided war, what greatly and tragically encouraged the coming of the war, was in fact, what seemed to be a binding alliance system. In the end, when you say they pursued their national interests, they pursued it because they were subject to the alliance system . . . And that click of this presumably binding alliance system that bound them to each other, that also divided them.
[This] is not a question that yields much information. In the countries in Europe there was then no fully functioning democracy in our sense of it. Our sense of it is that a democracy means huge amounts of public information all the time, huge press establishment, etc. . . Even if there had been a lively public response, the time span between Sarajevo (Francis Ferdinand and Sophie’s assassination) on June 28, 1914, and the outbreak of the war on August 4 is something like five weeks.
The reactions were probably diverse . . . there were some who were for the war, and some of who were against the coming of war, but [these reactions] would not reveal a great deal given that only some seven countries at that time had enfranchised most of their males. Only seven of the thirty some countries . . . being involved in this had given the franchise (the vote) to their males.
As some experts point out . . . political elites were not seriously challenged by public opinion as yet. In other words . . . the elites that ran the countries often also were part of the elites that ran the newspapers. Which is to say, they manipulated public opinion. If there’s anything coming out at that time, it’ll be pretty much manipulated stuff. . . . Political elites were not as threatened by public opinion as they are today. The fact that they controlled the press is a big factor. It was more of a hierarchical society and less of a democratic one, so that public opinion did not play the kind of role that it did later on. It was more of a hierarchical society. . . it wasn’t fully democratic yet in any sense. The press was new at the time too.
Was Russian mobilization the key factor in the escalation of a localized conflict into a European war?
Russian mobilization was not the key factor. . . . It was one key factor. . . . Russia’s primitive railway network meant that their mobilization was to be so slow as to necessitate. . . . that they mobilize before the war. . . . The Austrian declaration on the 28 July may have been a more important factor. . . . Germany . . . did not seek to actively halt the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.
Do you believe that political leaders could have avoided war?
If there had been a genuine European interdependence, the leaders could have avoided war. Yes, they could have avoided war, what greatly and tragically encouraged the coming of the war, was in fact, what seemed to be a binding alliance system. In the end, when you say they pursued their national interests, they pursued it because they were subject to the alliance system . . . And that click of this presumably binding alliance system that bound them to each other, that also divided them.